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Abstract
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duration is more sensitive to unemployment than conventionally thought. This result comes
from solving the equilibrium of the model instead of just varying the unemployment-
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1 Introduction
Search theory is the main modelling framework used in the theory of labour markets.
Finding a partner is time consuming and uncertain, and consequently unemployed and
vacancies meet in some kind of random manner. Often the exact meeting process is
side stepped by postulating a matching function that tells the number of employment
relationships produced given the number of unemployed and vacancies. Denoting the
number of unemployed by U and the number of vacancies by V the number of matches
is then given byM = m(U, V ) where m is the matching function. Usually, m is assumed
to be increasing in both arguments and homogenous of degree one. On average, an
unemployed worker finds a job during a period with probabilitym(U, V )/U , and a vacant
job is filled with probability m(U, V )/V . In a steady state equilibrium the inverses of
these probabilities are the mean durations of unemployment and vacancies, respectively.
In a survey of matching functions Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p. 402) claim
that a simple urn-ball model fails to produce unemployment durations that are observed
empirically: “. . . It is, however, too naïve to be empirically a good approximation to
matching in real labor markets. For example, it implies an implausible combination
of levels and durations of unemployment. If the level of unemployment and vacancies
is the same, the mean duration of unemployment is 1.58 periods, and if the level of
unemployment is three times as high as that of vacancies, mean duration is 3.16. In
actual labor markets duration would rise by more than the function
£
M = V
¡
1− e−U/V
¢¤
implies when the level of unemployment is higher.”
There are basically two methods for assessing whether the simple urn-ball model
produces empirically observed unemployment durations. As the duration depends only
on ratio U/V , one can vary the ratio and compare the theoretical durations to the
observed ones. This requires reliable data on both unemployed and vacancies. If data on
vacancies, for example, is missing or unreliable but there is data on unemployment and
job separation probability then one can evaluate the urn-ball model by using equilibrium
analysis. We choose this approach.
We study how the duration of unemployment is aﬀected in an urn-ball model when the
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absolute number of unemployed changes. We specify an equilibriummodel where changes
in one variable cannot take place without changes in other variables. In particular, an
increase in the number of unemployed requires a decrease in the number of firms, or an
increase in the labour force or in the job separation rate. Keeping track of the eﬀects
of these changes requires that one solves the new equilibrium values for the stocks of
active firms and workers as well as the stocks of unemployed and vacancies. It turns out
that when the number of unemployed is, say, tripled this necessitates a decrease in the
number of vacancies such that the equilibrium ratio U/V more than triples. Thus, the
duration is more sensitive to unemployment than one would expect by just tripling the
unemployment-vacancy ratio.
We derive the urn-ball model in Section 2. In Section 3 we present the equilibrium
analysis when unemployment increases because the number of firms decreases. In Section
4 we consider a model where change in unemployment is driven by a change in the labour
force. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Urn-Ball Model
In the urn-ball model the vacancies present the urns, and the unemployed play the role
of the balls which are randomly placed in the urns. The number of balls ending up in an
urn is thus binomially distributed. Some urns end up with one ball, some urns end up
with several balls, and some urns remain empty. The coordination failure is due to the
lack of information about the other applicants’ actions. The model can be enriched but
here we focus just on the equilibrium meetings that are assumed symmetric and random.
We do not say anything about how the meetings come about but for instance, a model
with posted wages exhibits the matching function (1) in a symmetric equilibrium.
The matching function is
M = V
h
1− (1− 1/V )U
i
, (1)
where (1− 1/V )Udenotes the probability that a vacancy receives no applications. The
probability that a vacancy receives at least one application multiplied by V gives us (1),
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the expected number of matches. For large U and V the magnitude (1− 1/V )Ucan be
approximated with e−U/V , i.e. the binomial distribution can be approximated with a
Poisson distribution with parameter U/V , giving the following matching function:
M = V
¡
1− e−U/V
¢
. (2)
Denoting the mean duration of unemployment by D we have
D = (M/U)−1 =
£
(V/U)
¡
1− e−U/V
¢¤−1
. (3)
We can easily verify the durations mentioned by Petrongolo and Pissarides. Let U = V .
Then D = (1− e−1)−1 ≈ 1.58. If U = 3V , we have D = [(1/3) (1− e−3)]−1 ≈ 3.16.
3 The Duration of Unemployment when the Number
of Employers Changes
Varying the number of employers, or production possibilities, is a natural way of mod-
elling changes in unemployment. Employers enter or exit the economy because of shocks
to productivity, demand, discount factor, recruiting cost, bargaining power etc. Analysing
how these “ultimate” factors aﬀect unemployment and its duration requires a job creation
condition (see e.g. Pissarides 2000, ch. 1), but in order to test the matching function we
take the change in the number of employers as given.
The labour force consists of W workers, of whom U are unemployed, and the rest are
employed. There are E employers who either have hired one worker or are vacant. The
number of vacancies is denoted V . There are equally many employed workers and filled
jobs:
W − U = E − V. (4)
We assume that these numbers are large and that the agents meet according to the
urn-ball matching function (2). Jobs terminate at an exogenous separation probability
s ∈ [0, 1], and the worker and the employer start looking for partners again. The flow into
unemployment is equal to s (W − U), and it is equal to the flow s (E − V ) into vacancies.
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We consider a steady-state equilibrium where the flows out of and into unemployment
are equal:
V
¡
1− e−U/V
¢
= s(W − U). (5)
Equation (5) is the Beveridge curve. For givenW and s it depicts the steady state values
for U and V . It is straightforward to show that it is downward sloping in (U, V ) plane
and convex to the origin.
The model consists of equations (4) and (5) where E, W , and s are exogenous vari-
ables, and U and V are determined in an equilibrium. It is trivial to show that (4) and
(5) have a unique solution for U and V for given values of E, W and s even though
we cannot solve for U and V explicitly. In the analysis of this section we let E change
and determine the equilibrium responses of U and V . Also a variation in s aﬀects the
steady state, but there is strong empirical evidence that s is practically constant (“My
findings that the job-finding rate is strongly procyclical and the separation rate is nearly
acyclical oppose the conventional wisdom that recessions are primarily characterized by
a high separation rate.” (Shimer 2005. p. 493)).
We solve the unemployment duration by tracking the Beveridge curve numerically
when E changes. To avoid computational problems we, instead of decreasing E directly,
let U increase. The algorithm is the following: (i) Give initial values to E, W , and s.
The values of E and W must be large in order to justify the use of matching function
(2), and they must be close to each other to facilitate computation. (ii) Use equation
(4) and the Beveridge curve (5) to calculate the initial values of U and V . (iii) Give
increasing values to U , and use the Beveridge curve to compute the corresponding V .
(iv) Use equation (3) to calculate the duration. Finally, one can use equation (4) to find
the value of E which gives the U, V,D calculated.
A Numerical Example
Let E = W initially, in other words, there is no structural unemployment. Then
U = V in equilibrium. We postulate that W and the initial value of E are one hundred
million. The shape of the Beveridge curve and thereby unemployment duration depends
on the value of s, and therefore we use two alternative period lengths: a week and a
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month. We pick the monthly separation probability from U.S. data1: sm = 0.033. The
weekly separation probability sw is then determined by sm = 1 − (1− sw)30/7. For
sm = 0.033 this gives sw = 0.008. Initially, U = V = 1249000 using sw = 0.008, and
U = V = 4961500 using sm = 0.033. We compute the unemployment duration when
unemployment changes from the initial value to eightfold.
Figure 1: Unemployment duration for multiples of U and multiples of U/V .
Figure 1 depicts unemployment duration in periods when U/V changes from one to
eight and when U changes from initial value (1249000 or 4961500, depending on the
value of s) to eightfold. The duration responds more sharply to an increase in absolute
unemployment than to an increase in U/V . If we are interested in how the duration
1Total separations, nonfarm, seasonally adjusted, 2001 - 2007. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistic. sana
5
changes when something happens to the absolute number of unemployed people, then
this exercise is quite satisfying in the sense that the too small duration generated by the
too straightforward use of the urn-ball model, namely 3.16 turns out not to be the true
duration. When the separation rate becomes larger, the duration responds more strongly
to a change in unemployment. Table 1 shows the computed durations and the associated
value of U/V when U increases from the initial value to eightfold. In tables 1 and 2 we
denote Un = nU1.
Table 1
Unemployment duration and unemployment/vacancy ratio when the number of firms
changes.
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8
D when sw = 0.008 1.58 3.20 4.87 6.58 8.33 10.13 11.98 13.89
U/V when sw = 0.008 1 3.05 4.83 6.57 8.33 10.13 11.98 13.89
D when sm = 0.033 1.58 3.34 5.30 7.50 10.00 12.85 16.13 19.95
U/V when sm = 0.033 1 3.20 5.27 7.50 10.00 12.86 16.13 19.95
4 The Duration of Unemployment when the Labour
Force Changes
Assume next that changes in unemployment are driven by changes in the labour force
(or, equivalent in this context, participation) while keeping the number of employers
fixed. The labour force changes because of exogenous shocks like a change in the value
of leisure, but for our purposes we take the change in W as given. As before, each firm
can hire one worker, which implies W − U = E − V . In a steady state
V
¡
1− e−U/V
¢
= s (E − V ) (6)
where s (E − V ) is the flow from the filled jobs to vacancies. Using (6) instead of (5)
allows fixing the value of E. The algorithm for computing the equilibrium unemployment
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duration is the same as above. For convenient computation we do not increaseW directly
but we let U increase.
A Numerical Example
Let W and E to be one hundred million initially, and we use the same separation
probabilities as above. Table 2 depicts unemployment duration and the corresponding
U/v when unemployment changes from the initial value (1249000 or 4961500, depending
on the value of s) to eightfold.
Table 2
Unemployment duration and unemployment/vacancy ratio when the size of the labour
force changes.
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8
D when sw = 0.008 1.58 3.15 4.72 6.30 7.87 9.45 11.02 12.60
U/V when sw = 0.008 1 3.00 4.68 6.29 7.87 9.45 11.02 12.60
D when sm = 0.033 1.58 3.11 4.66 6.21 7.77 9.32 10.87 12.43
U/V when sm = 0.033 1 2.95 4.61 6.20 7.77 9.33 10.87 12.43
Comparing the durations in tables 1 and 2 we see that the duration is more sensi-
tive to a decrease in E than to a an increase in W , given the increase in the absolute
unemployment. This is because Beveridge curve (6) is flatter than Beveridge curve (5)
for all values of U (when U is on the horizontal axis and V on the vertical axis): Denote
U/V ≡ x. On (5) we have dV/dU = − (e−x + s) / (1− e−x − xe−x), and on (6) we have
dV/dU = − (e−x) / (1− e−x − xe−x + s). The diﬀerence of the absolute slopes is equal
to s (1− xe−x + s) / [(1− e−x − xe−x) (1− e−x − xe−x + s)] > 0 ∀x > 0.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how to compute the equilibrium duration of unemployment when un-
employment increases, in a model where unemployed and vacancies meet according to
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a simple urn-ball matching function. The increase in unemployment is assumed to be
driven by a decrease in the number of employers or an increase in the labour force. This
method can be used to evaluate the empirical validity of the urn-ball matching function
if one has data on unemployment and job separation probabilities but not on vacancies.
We show that the duration is more sensitive to unemployment than one would expect by
just changing the unemployment-vacancy ratio.
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